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Lawyer Beware: The Use
Of Counsel's Statements
As Evidence Against His Client
In Tax Fraud Cases
By LAWRENCE S. FELD and LEONARD R. ROSENBLATT

According to the authors, in criminal tax cases,
in view of the language of the power of
attorney and the multiple opportunities for the
practitioner to make statements to government
representatives during the investigation or
the administrative review process, extreme
care must be taken to avoid making statements
that may be used as evidence against the
taxpayer. Lawrence S. Feld is a partner in
the law firm of Kostelanetz & Ritholz in New
York City. Leonard R. Rosenblatt is an attorney
specializing in criminal and civil tax litigation
in New York City.

Among the hazards that a tax practitioner
faces in representing a client during a tax fraud
investigation is the danger that statements made
by the attorney to government representatives
during the investigation or the administrative
review process within the Internal Revenue
Service and the Department of Justice may be
used as evidence against the taxpayer. The few
reported cases on this subject support the admissibility of such statements by counsel as evidence against the taxpayer at the trial of the
criminal tax case. Since there appears to be a
growing tendency on the part of the Department
of Justice to offer such statements as part of
the government's proof at trial, it is essential
that the tax practitioner be keenly aware that
his advocacy of the taxpayer's cause before trial
possesses the potential of being converted into an
instrument for his client's conviction.

Administrative Conference
Procedures

0 1985, Lawrence S. Feld and Leonard R. Rosenblatt
618

Criminal tax investigations and prosecutions
are unique in certain respects. Perhaps the single
most special aspect of a criminal tax case is the
administrative conference procedure. Generally,
taxpayers are afforded three conference opportunities before a case is referred to the local United
States Attorney's Office for presentation to a
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grand jury and indictment. Those conferences
are conducted by the Criminal Investigation Division of the local IRS district, the corresponding Office of District Counsel, and the Criminal
Section of the Tax Division of the Department
of Justice in Washington, D. C. 1
From the government's viewpoint, the conferences have two purposes: (1) to provide the
taxpayer, or his authorized representative, with
some limited information concerning the proposed prosecution and (2) to provide the taxpayer with an opportunity to explain why the
prosecution should be avoided. From the defense
lawyer's viewpoint, the conferences may offer an
opportunity to gain some insight into the government's case and ascertain the "theory" of prosecution. However, many practitioners regard
these conferences as opportunities to provide the
IRS or Justice Department with factual material
to defend questioned transactions or to challenge
the accuracy of the government's evidence.
Practitioners who are not familiar with the
procedures and possible pitfalls of these conferences may be eager to make representations of
fact and advance arguments of fact and law as
to why the taxpayer should not be prosecuted.
On occasion, these statements and arguments
may convince the IRS or Justice Department to
abandon the criminal case. But there should be
a keen awareness that statements made by wellintentioned practitioners during these conferences
may ultimately be used against the taxpayer and
perhaps provide the critical element of proof in
an otherwise weak government case.

Agency and Scope of Employment
Statements of attorneys at pre-indictment
conferences have been admitted into evidence
against taxpayers as an exception to the hearsay
rule.2 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a
statement is not hearsay if it is made "by [a
party's] agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of his agency or employment,
made during the existence of the relationship."
In essence, under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), a statement by an agent concerning a matter within
his or her employment is deemed to be a statement, or admission, by his or her principal.
In several cases the courts have indicated
that attorneys are "agents" of their clients for
purposes of this rule. For example, in United
3
States v. Margiotta,
the mail fraud and extortion
prosecution of the Chairman of the Nassau County
Republican Committee, the Court of Appeals for
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the Second Circuit, in broad and troubling terms,
cautioned that statements "made by an attorney
concerning a matter within his employment may
be admissible against the party retaining the attorney."
In criminal tax cases, where the issues of the
attorney's "agency" and "scope of employment"
are addressed in the power of attorney required
by the IRS, taxpayers generally have been unsuccessful in excluding the admission of such
statements. In two decisions, United States v.
Dolleris,4 and United States v. O'Connor,5 the Courts
of Appeals stressed the importance of the language contained in the IRS power of attorney
in sanctioning the admission of statements of
taxpayers' attorneys.
In O'Connor, a failure-to-file prosecution, the
taxpayer's attorney, acting under a power of
attorney, attended an administrative conference
where he admitted to IRS officials that his client
had lied to them when the client insisted that he
had filed his tax returns. In affirming the taxpayer's conviction, the First Circuit sustained
the admission at trial of the attorney's statements
and rejected the taxpayer's argument that his
attorney had exceeded the scope of his authority.
Whatever question the appellate court may have
had about the scope of the attorney's authority
was answered by the power of attorney, which
stated that he had "full power and authority
to do and perform all and every act or thing
whatsoever required and necessary" in matters
pertaining to federal taxes.
Similarly, in Dolleris, a tax evasion prosecution,
an attorney's statements to IRS officials regarding the disposition of the cash proceeds of unreported scrap sales were admitted at trial against
the taxpayer. The Dolleris court also stressed
the broad wording of the power of attorney in
rejecting the taxpayer's argument of lack of
authority.

Power of Attorney
With a power of attorney on file with the
IRS, a taxpayer will be hard pressed to argue
that his attorney's statements were unauthorized.
The typical power of attorney (Form 2848) provides:
' See, generally, Fink, Tax Fraud, § 6.01.
'Rule 801(d) (2) (D), Federal Rules of Evidence.
'662 F. 2d 131, 142-43 (CA-2 1981).
469-1 usTrc jf 9289, 408 F. 2d 918 (CA-6), cert. denied,
395 U. S. 943 (1969).
'70-2 us'rc 9649, 433 F. 2d 752 (CA-l), cert. denied,

401 U. S.911 (1970).
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The attorney(s)-in-fact (or either of them)
are authorized, subject to revocation, to receive confidential information and to perform
any and all acts that the principal(s) can
perform with respect to the above specified
tax matters....

and the internal reviews that follow have
resulted in a decision (arrived at unilaterally
by IRS and not by negotiation) not to refer
to the Department of Justice. The consequence of this is that compromises can only
be negotiated in cases where IRS has decided
not to refer.8

One can hardly imagine a broader authorization.
The particular language of the power of
attorney is probably not determinative of the
issue of whether the attorney's statements were
within the scope of his authority. While it is certainly evidence of authority, express authorization as broadly worded as the provision quoted
above may even be unnecessary to bind the taxpayer under the current Federal Rules of Evidence. Whereas the common law rule, under
which O'Connor and Dolleris were decided, made
the admissibility of such statements dependent
upon whether the statements were within the
scope of the agent's employment, the current
rule looks to whether the statement concerns a
matter within the scope of the agent's employment. As such, Rule 801(d) (2) (D) substantially
broadened the traditional rule. As Chief Judge
Jack B. Weinstein of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York has
commented:
Once agency, and the making of the statement while the relationship continues are
established, the statement is exempt from
the hearsay rule so long as it related to a
matter within the scope of the agency. 6

Compromise Negotiations
Taxpayers faced with the offer of statements
made by their attorneys have advanced several
arguments against admissibility. Some taxpayers
have attempted to argue that the statements are
inadmissible under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which excludes evidence of offers
in compromise
However, taxpayers seeking to
exclude statements under Rule 408 must overcome two obstacles. First, conferences with Special Agents and District Counsel attorneys are
not generally understood to be "compromise negotiations." In fact, neither Special Agents nor
District Counsel attorneys have the authority to
compromise a criminal case. As one court has
noted:
. . . after a Special Agent of the CID is
assigned, the taxpayer will at most be allowed to come in, and will be listened to,
but no negotiations will be engaged in until
after the investigation has been completed,
620

Second, most conferences with Special Agents
and District Counsel attorneys begin with the
admonition that plea bargaining, civil settlement,
negotiation and compromise will not be considered or discussed. In view of this warning, it
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to argue that the taxpayer's attorney mistakenly
believed himself or herself to be engaged in a
compromise discussion.
With respect to conferences before the Tax
Division of the Department of Justice, the conferee attorney may very well have the authority
to "compromise" a criminal case. However, as
in District Counsel conferences, defense attorneys at Tax Division conferences are customarily
advised that plea bargaining and civil settlement
will not be discussed.

Statements Made During Plea
Discussions
Other taxpayers have argued that such statements are inadmissible under Rule 410 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which excludes statements made during plea discussions with prosecuting attorneys. With respect to statements
made to Special Agents and District Counsel
attorneys, Rule 410 is not applicable because
neither are attorneys for the prosecuting authority, i. e., the Justice Department. With respect
to statements made to Department of Justice personnel, the warning that plea bargaining will not
be discussed will usually preclude a taxpayer's
reliance on Rule 410.

Unauthorized Statements
Another approach to the exclusion of such
statements is to argue that they were in fact
unauthorized. However, since such statements
need only "concern" a matter within the scope
of employment to satisfy Rule 801(d) (2) (D),
14 Weinstein's Evidence, 1 801(d)(2)(D)[01], p. 801162.

,E.g., Tony Abatti, CCH Dec. 35,444(M), 37 TCM
1597 (1978), rev'd and remanded, 81-1 USTC ir 9442, 644
F. 2d 1385 (CA-9).
" United States v. Garden State National Bank, 79-I
usrc r 9262, 465 F. Supp. 437, 439 (D. N. J.),- aff'd on
other grounds, 79-2 usrc ff 9632, 607 F. 2d 61 (CA-3).
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the taxpayer would have to show that the specific
statement did not concern his employment. If
the attorney was retained, as is usually the case,
to conduct the defense according to his own best
judgment, it seems that such statements, even if
they are later used as evidence against the taxpayer, are admissible. For example, the Dolleris
court rejected the argument that the attorney's
admission of his client's misconduct was unauthorized as follows:
The attorney may well have thought that an
explanation for the motive for his client's
misconduct would constitute, over all, a net
gain in the eyes of the Service, which already
appeared to believe that the misconduct had
occurred. It was clearly within the power
and duty of the attorney to do what he could,
in his own best judgment, to dispel the suspicions of the Internal Revenue Service and
avoid indictment.9
Under this rationale, it seems likely that statements of counsel, even if they amount to a complete confession, will be considered by the courts
to be authorized statements.

Policy
Despite the lack of success with which these
arguments have met, there are substantial policy
reasons why such statements should be excluded.
First, the importance that a jury may place on
the statement of a taxpayer's former lawyer may
be unduly prejudicial. If a jury were to hear,
for example, that the defendant's former lawyer
admitted that unidentified deposits were "skimmed"
business receipts, a jury may place less importance on other available evidence tending to
establish a valid legal defense.
Moreover, the admission of an attorney's
statements will undoubtedly result in the consumption of additional trial time to explore the
circumstances under which the statements were
made and the reasons why they were of significance at that time. These matters will divert the
jury's attention from the government's burden
of proving all the elements of the particular
crime with which the defendant has been charged.
In addition, a defendant faced with the admission of such evidence may have to choose
between calling his former lawyer as a witness
to explain his statements, thereby possibly waiving the attorney-client privilege, or taking the
witness stand himself, thereby risking cross-ex-
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amination as to a prior criminal record or "similar act" evidence.

Suggested Solutions
One suggested solution to the problem has
been to modify the language of the power of
attorney to specifically exclude the authority to
make factual admissions. By this modification,
it is hoped that a trial court will be compelled
to exclude statements made under the power of
attorney as being unauthorized. However, there
can be no assurance that the IRS will accept a
power of attorney modified in this fashion. Moreover, the benefit of the suggestion may be illusory, since an attorney who provided the IRS
with any factual information under such a power
may subject himself to criticism or even disciplinary proceedings for having made an unauthorized disclosure on behalf of a client.
Another suggestion has been to refrain from
making factual assertions and instead present
all assertions of fact in hypothetical terms. In
this fashion, it is hoped that whatever statements
are made will be excluded as mere argument.
While this approach may be helpful, caution
must be exercised to prevent later disputes over
what information was presented as "fact" and
what as "argument." Moreover, the possibility
exists that even a hypothetical assertion of fact,
if determined by subsequent investigation to be
materially false or misleading, may be admissible
against a taxpayer at trial on the theory that it
constitutes evidence equivalent to a false exculpatory statement. 10 Research has failed to locate
any authority regarding the admissibility of such
hypothetical statements.

Conclusion
In any criminal case, the decision to make
factual representations should be approached
with extreme caution. In criminal tax cases, in
view of the language of the power of attorney
and the multiple opportunities to make statements, extreme care must be taken to avoid
making such statements and to insure that any
statements made will not prejudice the client. 0
9433 F. 2d at 756.
9739,
1" See, e. g., United States v. Wilkins, 67-2 USTC
385 F. 2d 465, 472 (CA-4), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 915
(1968) ("Subsequent acts of a defendant, such as the
fabrication of evidence or false explanations which will
aid his defense, are clearly admissible to prove his guilty
state of mind.").
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